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Abstract  
This paper focuses on pre-enactment review of legislation as a constitutional tool for the 
protection of recognised rights. The paper first makes the distinction between strong- and 
weak-form judicial review, in order to analyse how pre-enactment review can be 
practiced within each constitutional model. Two countries are first looked at to illustrate 
the two models: the United States for strong-form review, and New Zealand for weak-
form review. The absence of any formal pre-enactment review in the United States is 
noted, and evaluated through a more in-depth assessment of congressional practice. This 
observation leads to the main proposal of the paper: that pre-enactment review should be 
made mandatory in the United States.  
 
A comparative assessment is then made in order to discuss the proposal. The relevant 
constitutional practices in Australia, Canada and Japan are outlined. These comparative 
assessments are used to further delineate the appropriate form that mandatory pre-
enactment review of legislation could take in the United States. 
 
 
 
Key Words 
Pre-enactment review; proposed legislation; United States 
  
4  
 
4 
 
 
I Introduction  
 
A core feature of any constitutional democracy is undoubtedly the protection of certain 
fundamental rights. The decision lies not in whether to uphold these protected rights, but 
in the way this should be done. Largely, it comes down to resolving how governmental 
power should be organised and to what extent each branch of government should be 
accountable for making rights-based determinations. This is a question of institutional 
design. 
 
Judicial review of legislation, and in particular the assessment of its relative merits and 
shortcomings, has been the focus of ongoing academic debate within the question of 
institutional organisation.1 The practice of judicial review itself has been connected with 
constitutional or judicial supremacy, whereas it has traditionally been rejected by the 
opposing arrangement of parliamentary sovereignty or legislative supremacy.  
 
Judicial review now exists in two models: strong- or weak-form.2 This paper is predicated 
on the distinction between the two. Strong-form judicial review refers to the traditional 
conception that is adhered to in systems of constitutional or judicial supremacy. As the 
name might suggest, strong-form review empowers the judiciary with the general 
authority to determine issues of constitutional interpretation.3 This judicial determination 
is overriding and final as it relates to the other governmental branches.  
 
Weak-form judicial review, by contrast, was more recently contrived and is the concept 
that is now linked to systems of legislative or parliamentary sovereignty.4 Weak-form 
review does generally accept the judicial power to evaluate legislation and determine its 
conformity with constitutional provisions; the difference is that this judicial review power 
is diluted, since an ordinary legislative majority can displace any such determinations 
under weak-form review.5 Thus, weak-form judicial review is compatible with 
  
1 See R Fallon ‘The Core of an Uneasy Case for Judicial Review’ (2008) 121 HLR 1693 and M Kumm 
‘Institutionalising Socratic Contestation: The Rationalist Human Rights Paradigm, Legitimate Authority 
and the Point of Judicial Review’ (2007) 1 EJLS No. 2. 
2 See M Tushnet “Alternative forms of Judicial Review” (2003) 101 Mich. L. Rev.  
3 At 2784. 
4At 2784; and see generally P Hogg Constitutional Law of Canada (5th ed, Thomson/Carswell, 
Scarborough, Ontario, 2007). 
5 M Tushnet, above n 2, at 2786.  
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parliamentary sovereignty, as the power of the final word rests with the legislative branch 
of government under each of these doctrines. 
 
The focus of this paper is not the practice of judicial review itself; rather, the analysis is 
directed toward a mechanism for rights protection that is found within certain 
constitutional systems: the pre-enactment political review of legislation. This refers to the 
ex ante review of proposed legislation undertaken by one or both of the legislative or 
executive branches of government, as distinct from the ex post rights review that can be 
carried out by the judicial branch.  
 
The paper will explore the exercise of political review of legislation, with particular 
regard to how it differs within the distinct constitutional models of weak- and strong-form 
judicial review. It will be noted that weak-form jurisdictions tend to incorporate political 
rights review as a core constitutional feature, while strong-form review instead assigns 
the responsibility of rights protection primarily to the judicial branch. Despite this general 
trend, certain strong-form review jurisdictions do incorporate some formal political rights 
review of proposed legislation. There is, however, a distinct omission of any formal pre-
enactment review in the most prominent system of strong-form judicial review: the 
United States. This paper explores and challenges this omission, by ultimately proposing 
that some political pre-enactment review ought to be made mandatory in the United 
States. This suggestion will be evaluated through a discussion of the ways in which pre-
enactment review can be implemented, by way of comparison with other jurisdictions, 
and, in particular, what impact this may have on the current United States constitutional 
culture.  
 
Part II will assess the key features of strong-form judicial review, using the United States 
to illustrate how judicial review can regulate constitutional practice and to discuss how 
the doctrine has faced criticism. Part III addresses weak-form judicial review, and its key 
feature of pre-enactment review, before assessing New Zealand’s constitutional 
framework to demonstrate how it can be institutionalised. Part IV outlines the main issue 
to be discussed: the absence of formal pre-enactment review in the United States 
Congress. This is introduced by analysing United States congressional practice, both 
current and historical, as well as looking at the recent ‘Constitutional Authority 
Statement’ requirement. Part V advances the proposal that pre-enactment review of 
legislation should be made mandatory in the United States. Section A of Part V looks at 
whether this is prima facie a viable proposal for the United States while also canvassing 
the potential arguments against such a requirement. Section B of Part V further evaluates 
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this proposal, by considering, in turn, how pre-enactment review is implemented in 
Australia, Canada and Japan. Part VI discusses and summarises the preceding evaluation, 
to ascertain how the pre-enactment proposal could be advanced. Part VII consists of a 
final conclusion to the paper.  
 
II Strong-form Judicial Review 
A An Overview 
Strong-form judicial review is the constitutional model that is often aligned with 
constitutional or judicial supremacy. It was first established in the United States, in direct 
rejection of the system of parliamentary sovereignty, which otherwise prevailed at the 
time.6 Strong-form review imposes constitutional limits on the legislature by means of a 
codified bill of rights, which the courts will enforce.7  
 
Under strong-form review, the judiciary has “a wide-ranging power” to review legislation 
for bill of rights consistency, with the authority to invalidate statutes that infringe its 
provisions.8 The courts’ constitutional interpretations are authoritative and binding on the 
other branches, at least in the “short to medium run”.9 Judicial interpretations are not seen 
as absolutely binding since they can be overturned by subsequent constitutional 
amendment or later rejected by the courts themselves, signalling a change in 
constitutional doctrine.10 Thus, strong-form review “effectively gives exclusive voice to 
the highest court” in relation constitutional interpretation.11 
 
Judicial review is considered by some to be a key constitutional check by the judiciary on 
the powers of the other branches of government12 and even a precondition of the 
legitimacy of law.13 The doctrine insists that courts function well as “forum[s] of 
  
6 See S Gardbaum The New Commonwealth Model of Constitutionalism: Theory and Practice (Cambridge 
University Press, Cambridge, 2013), at 3. 
7 See M Tushnet “New Forms of Judicial Review and the Persistence of Rights – And Democracy – Based 
Worries (2003) 38 Wake Forest L. Rev. 813. 
8 At 814; And S Gardbaum, above n 6, at 2. 
9 M Tushnet, above n 2, at 2784. 
10 At 2784. 
11 S Gardbaum, above n 6, at 62. 
12 See C Montesquieu The Spirit of Laws (G Bell & Sons, Ltd, London, 1914). 
13 See M Kumm, above n 1, at 1; and R Dworkin, Freedom’s Law: The Moral Reading of the American 
Constitution (Harvard University Press, Cambridge, 1996) at 123. 
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principle” to protect against the under-enforcement of rights.14 The courts’ power to 
exercise this form of review is either established by the constitutional document of a 
country, often with a requirement for judges to strike down irreconcilable legislation,15 or 
it can originate from the courts themselves.16 
B The United States 
The oldest example of strong judicial review is found in the United States, where the 
supreme law Constitution governs. The United States Constitution does not explicitly 
establish the power of judicial review, but the Supreme Court is accepted as the 
institution with overarching and final authority on issues of constitutionality.17 Strong 
judicial review means the judiciary has not only the power to interpret legislation to be 
consistent with the Constitution, but has the ability to strike down any legislation as 
unconstitutional. Such determinations are final in the short-term: binding unless there is 
some constitutional amendment or development of judicial doctrine to displace the 
judicial resolution.18 In practice, judicial review of legislation is exercised relatively 
frequently to invalidate unconstitutional laws in the United States, when compared with 
other strong-form jurisdictions.19 
C Criticisms of Strong-form Judicial Review  
Despite strong judicial review being of longstanding practice within countless 
constitutional systems,20 distinct opposition to the doctrine can easily be identified. It is 
said that “[t]he central problem with strong-form judicial review is not that rights-based 
judicial review has no value or cannot be justified at all, but that it is too strong”.21 Fierce 
criticism of the doctrine has been made; Jeremy Waldron has argued against strong 
judicial review based on the reasoning that rights are not necessarily any better protected 
by the judiciary than they would be by democratic legislatures, and that judicial review 
itself is democratically illegitimate.22 Strong judicial review has been seen as representing 
  
14 R Dworkin A Matter of Principle (Harvard University Press, Cambridge, 1985) at 69-71. 
15 See M Tushnet, above n 2, at 2784. 
16 For example, the United States Constitution contains no explicit grant of judicial review power, but it 
was inferred by CJ Marshall in William Marbury v James Madison 5 US 137 (1803). 
17 See William Marbury v James Madison 5 US 137 (1803) at 177.  
18 M Tushnet, above n 2, at 2784. 
19 This is discussed further in Part V of this paper. See also J Husa “Guarding the Constitutionality of Laws 
in the Nordic Countries: A Comparative Perspective” (2000) 48 AJCL 345 at 365. 
20 See S Gardbaum, above n 6, at 4-5 (for a discussion of countries that have adopted a model where 
“legislative power is legally limited and courts are empowered to enforce these limits”). 
21 S Gardbaum, above n 6, at 61. 
22 See J Waldron “The Core of the Case Against Judicial Review” (2006) 115 Yale LJ 1346. 
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a departure from democratic decision-making, which carries a heavy burden of 
justification. The core legitimacy concern with judicial review has been summed up by 
the phrase “the counter-majoritarian difficulty”.23 This phrase embodies the notion that 
when unelected judges declare a legislative act unconstitutional “it thwarts the will of 
representatives of the actual people of the here and now”24 so it undermines the will of 
the majority. Criticism has also been based on mistrust of the judicial branch; it is said 
that strong judicial review makes it possible for “reckless courts to interfere needlessly 
with policy choices democratic majorities should be allowed to make.”25 This is where 
strong judicial review succumbs to criticism as compared to its weak form, which is seen 
as a means to protect against the under-enforcement of rights that is a lesser departure 
from democratic decision-making.26 Even within Waldron’s criticisms of judicial review, 
he has distinguished the two strands and expressed that only strong judicial review is the 
“target of his critique”.27 These critiques have especially been made of the United States’ 
constitutional system, where, in practice, the judiciary has exercised somewhat extensive 
strike-down of legislation.  
 
These criticisms of strong-form review perhaps did, at least in part, contribute to the 
development of weak-form judicial review as an alternative constitutional model.28 
 
III Weak-Form Judicial Review 
A An Overview 
Of the two mutually exclusive strands of judicial review, the weak-form version is the 
newer conception.29 It was first developed with the enactment of the Canadian Bill of 
Rights Act 1960 and has since been incorporated into several jurisdictions worldwide. 
Weak-form review has become a feature especially within jurisdictions of parliamentary 
or legislative sovereignty, since the traditional ‘Westminster model’ of sovereignty is no 
longer ‘available’.30  
  
23 See A Bickel The Least Dangerous Branch: The Supreme Court at the Bar of Politics (2nd ed, Yale 
University Press, 1986), at 16-17.  
24 At 16-17.  
25 M Tushnet, above n 7, at 814. 
26 See S Gardbaum, above n 6, at 61-62. 
27 J Waldron, above n 22, at 1354. 
28 See M Tushnet, above n 2. 
29 See P Hogg, above n 4; for additional developments see New Zealand Bill of Rights Act 1990; and 
Human Rights Act 1998 (UK). 
30 See M Tushnet, above n 2.  
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Weak judicial review recognises the “benefits of both legislative and judicial reasoning in 
terms of their contributions to rights deliberation and protection against under-
enforcement, but within an institutional structure that affords the power of the final word 
to the former.”31 Weak judicial review may still involve some form of judicial oversight 
of legislation, but the enforcement of judicial interpretation is more limited. The courts 
cannot necessarily strike down rights-inconsistent legislation, and judicial decisions are 
ultimately subject to legislative override powers. 
 
The legislature has final authority, while the judiciary serves as a ‘checking point’ with 
an interpretative, alerting and informing function with respect to rights issues.32 Weak-
form review does not narrow the scope of judicial review;33 rather, it recognises that, 
despite a judicial determination of rights-inconsistency, the legislature has overriding 
authority on such issues and may displace any judicial determination by an ordinary 
legislative majority.34 Weak-form review has responded to the concern that strong 
judicial review allows courts with little or no democratic mandate to displace decisions 
taken by institutions with greater democratic mandate.35 Instead, it shares responsibility 
for the protection of rights between the government branches. 
B A Key Feature: Pre-enactment Review of Legislation 
A key aspect of weak-form judicial review is pre-enactment review of legislation. This is 
the mandatory, political rights review of proposed statutes. This is a non-judicial 
technique of rights protection, which is designed to “build into the legislative process 
itself a counter against any tendency towards under-enforcement of rights in legislative 
outputs”.36 It requires “both of the elective branches of government to engage in rights 
review of a proposed statute before and during the bill’s legislative process”.37 Pre-
enactment review has developed within weak-form judicial review to counter traditional 
concerns about legislative or majoritarian supremacy. These concerns are addressed by 
ensuring that both the executive (in proposing bills) and the legislature (in considering 
  
31 S Gardbaum, above n 6, at 64. 
32 S Gardbaum, above n 6, at 64. 
33 M Tushnet, above n 2, at 2786.  
34 At 2786. 
35 At 2786. 
36 S Gardbaum, above n 6, at 132. 
37 At 25. 
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and enacting bills) remain attentive to protected rights, so that “specific rights concerns 
are identified and aired during the legislative process”.38  
 
Pre-enactment review refers to the ex ante review of proposed legislation by the 
legislative or executive branch. It creates an internal responsibility for rights protection, 
as opposed to the external, more indirect, and ex post technique of rights protection 
provided for by the judicial review of legislation. It is important to note that the pre-
enactment review referred to in this paper relates only to the review of proposed 
legislation by a political, rather than judicial organ of the state. An example of ex ante 
review of legislation by a judicial body might be the former practice of the French conseil 
constitutionnel, which had the authority to review parliamentary statutes after their 
adoption, but before promulgation, upon referral by elected politicians.39 The conseil 
constitutionnel now, however, also has jurisdiction to conduct ex post review of the 
constitutionality of enacted legislation. The status of the conseil constitutionnel as a 
judicial organ is largely unsettled,40 however, as one of the only constitutional courts with 
a jurisdiction that is not limited to ex post review of legislation, its arrangement is 
certainly an exceptional one. This paper will not assess such an institution, but will focus 
instead on the inclusion, or not, of the political ex ante review of legislation within 
constitutional organisations. 
C New Zealand 
Perhaps the best example of weak-form review is provided by New Zealand, where 
Parliamentary sovereignty is well-established,41 while the judiciary retains an 
interpretative function with regard to the rights review of legislation, rather than a final 
override authority.  
 
NZBORA is said to house the “basic building blocks” of New Zealand’s constitution.42 It 
is an ordinary statute, despite the initial proposals for a supreme, entrenched bill of rights 
with constitutional status.43 The Act proposes to “affirm, protect and promote human 
  
38 At 26. 
39 A Stone Sweet “The Politics of Constitutional Review in France and Europe” (January 2007) 5 ICON 69 
at 71. 
40 See A Stone Sweet, Governing with Judges: Constitutional Politics in Europe (Oxford University Press, 
2000) at 92-126. 
41 See the New Zealand Bill of Rights Act 1990 [NZBORA]. 
42 G Palmer and M Palmer Bridled Power: New Zealand Government Under MMP (3rd ed, Oxford 
University Press, Auckland, 1997) at 264. 
43 See G Palmer "A Bill of Rights for New Zealand: A White Paper" [1985] AJHR A6. 
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rights and fundamental freedoms” and to “affirm New Zealand’s commitment to the 
International Covenant on Civil and Political Rights”.44  
 
Although NZBORA applies to acts done by the legislature, executive and judiciary,45 it 
restricts judicial power so that no court has the power to invalidate, impliedly repeal, 
revoke, or treat as ineffective any legislation that is inconsistent with the Act.46 This 
adheres to the basic premise of weak-form judicial review: subordination of judicial 
authority to legislative override powers. New Zealand courts are directed to interpret all 
legislation consistently with protected rights, while the legislature retains the legal power 
of the final word so that any judicial decision is ultimately subject to the will of an 
ordinary legislative majority. 
 
NZBORA has also formalised pre-enactment review to enhance the protection of 
recognised rights. The Act sought to “put obstacles in the way of the executive when it is 
framing its legislative proposals” and ensures that “legislation conforms to basic 
principles, important standards, and real legal tests”.47 New Zealand’s techniques of pre-
enactment review include section 7 Attorney-General ‘vetting’ and select committee 
scrutiny of proposed legislation. 
1 Attorney-General Reporting 
Section 7 of NZBORA requires the Attorney-General to report to the House when 
proposed legislation appears to be inconsistent with the Act.48 The Attorney-General’s 
report is based on matters of law, rather than political judgment; it aims to generate 
constructive debate of NZBORA issues in the House, and to ensure that the House is 
aware of any inconsistency between a bill and NZBORA so that it can “give proper 
consideration to proposed legislation in that light”.49 Overall, the reporting requirement 
under s 7 recognises the standing of NZBORA in the development of government policy.  
 
Section 7 has resulted in numerous procedural requirements being formulated to achieve 
adequate consideration of NZBORA issues during both policy development and 
  
44 NZBORA 1990, preamble. 
45 NZBORA, s 3(a). 
46 NZBORA, s 4. 
47 G Palmer "New Zealand Bill of Rights Bill: Third Reading" (21 August 1990) 510 NZPD 3760. 
48 NZBORA, s 7. 
49 Westco Lagen v Attorney-General [2001] 1 NZLR 40 (HC) at [95] per McGechan J. 
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legislative drafting.50 First, as part of the s 7 “vetting” process, independent executive 
review is undertaken either by the Ministry of Justice51 or the Crown Law Office.52 
Where an inconsistency with rights is identified, the Attorney-General is advised and this 
advice is usually later made available to the public.53 On this advice, the Attorney-
General decides whether a report is required.54 Any report must stipulate which provision 
appears to be inconsistent with NZBORA and detail the nature of that inconsistency.55 
This report “can then be one of the issues debated by the House and considered by the 
Select Committee”.56  
 
The Attorney-General’s s 7 duty arises only once, at the introduction of a Bill;57 and there 
is no subsequent reporting duty if a Bill is amended, for example, after a select committee 
report or in the case of a supplementary order paper.58 In addition to these limitations, 
although the reporting function is designed as an ‘obstacle’ to legislature enactment,59 s 7 
does not preclude the legislature passing NZBORA-inconsistent legislation. Rather, it 
makes certain that any legislative action inconsistent with NZBORA is knowingly 
undertaken: a powerful political tool that “can be a potent weapon”.60 This non-binding 
nature of Attorney-General reports is further reiterated by the direction to members that a 
s 7 report outlining NZBORA inconsistencies “simply draws them to members’ 
attention” and “does not prevent the House from agreeing to such provisions.”61 Little or 
no indication is given by Parliament as to whether the dismissal or termination of a bill is 
ultimately directly linked to NZBORA inconsistencies identified by the Attorney-
General’s report. 
  
50 See A Butler “Strengthening the BOR” (2000) 31 VUWLR 129, at 145; and P Rishworth et al. The New 
Zealand Bill of Rights (Oxford University Press, Auckland, 2003), at 196.  
51 For non-Justice Bills. 
52 For Bills within the Justice portfolio. 
53 See Hon David Parker The Attorney-General’s Reporting Function under Section 7 of the New Zealand 
Bill of Rights Act 1990 (Ministry of Justice, available at www.justice.govt.nz). 
54 The Attorney-General makes a report only where a bill appears inconsistent with the Bill of Rights, per 
NZBORA s 7. 
55 Standing Orders of the House of Representatives 2011, SO 262. 
56 Easton v Governor-General [2012] NZHC 206, at [24] per Mallon J. 
57 NZBORA, s 7. 
58 Boscawen v Attorney-General [2009] NZCA 12 at [46]. 
59 See G Palmer, above n 43. 
60 G Palmer and M Palmer, above n 42, at 272. 
61 Effective House Membership: A Guide for Members of Parliament (Office of the Clerk of the House of 
Representatives, 2011) at 33 (available at www.parliament.nz); Standing Orders of the House of 
Representatives 2011, SO 262 
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Since the requirement was introduced in 1990, 59 Attorney-General reports under s 7 
have been produced. Of these, 28 related to Government Bills, while 31 reported 
NZBORA inconsistencies with regard to non-government bills. In 2011, only one 
Attorney-General report was tabled, which related to the right to an effective remedy.62 
The government bill in question proposed an amendment to the Prisoners’ and Victims’ 
Claims Act 2005. In the report, Attorney General Chris Finlayson states that he finds it 
“surprising” that a previous Attorney-General under opposition government “declined to 
issue a section 7 report” on the legislation now enacted.63 Finlayson goes on to state that s 
7 reports “are not designed to be politically convenient or appease the executive” and that 
“the Attorney-General has a law officer duty to report to Parliament on legislative 
provisions which may be inconsistent with the New Zealand Bill of Rights Act 1990.”64 
Following the s 7 report of inconsistency with NZBORA, the 2011 bill was terminated 
after its introduction,65 with no reading of the bill taking place in the House and without 
any Select Committee referral. Since the 2011 Attorney-General report, only one other 
bill has had a report for inconsistency,66 while no reports were tabled in 2013. 
 
Chris Finlayson, as the current Attorney-General, has spoken generally about his role in 
advising Parliament under s 7 NZBORA.67 In the interview, Finlayson revealed that upon 
receiving advice on a bill from the Crown Law Office or Ministry of Justice, he will not 
just “tick off” what is given to him by the officials;68 he will often write his own draft for 
the report or heavily rewrite the advice he has received. Finlayson also states that he 
regrets that the reporting function over the years “hasn’t always been observed,” citing 
the examples of the Foreshore and Seabed Act 2004 and the Electoral Finance Bill 2007, 
neither of which received s 7 reports. Finlayson adds that, on occasion, there is an early 
Bill of Rights inconsistency identified at the executive stage of legislative development, 
before any official s 7 report is submitted. This inconsistency can be made into an early 
  
62 Based on the Prisoners' and Victims' Claims (Redirecting Prisoner Compensation) Amendment Bill 2011. 
Report available at http://www.parliament.nz/resource/0000175160. 
63 Prisoners' and Victims' Claims (Redirecting Prisoner Compensation) Amendment Bill s 7 report, at cl 4. 
64 At cl 5. 
65 The bill was introduced on 13/10/2011 and terminated/discharged on 3/12/2012. 
66 Lobbying Disclosure Bill 2012, a non-government bill which was also terminated, this time following 
Select Committee recommendation. 
67 See the recorded video interview with Chris Finlayson. Interview available at: 
http://www.youtube.com/watch?v=Ba8VxZ6DZas. 
68 Video interview, C Finlayson (at 2:08). 
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report, and circulated among legislators to “cause the legislation itself to be amended” so 
that it is NZBORA compliant.69 
 
The mandatory reporting function under s 7 NZBORA thus establishes transparency and 
a degree of accountability within the legislative process. It creates a responsibility for the 
legislative and executive branches to ensure that rights are upheld. The understanding 
created is that only when there are significant political imperatives should Parliament 
legislate adverse to a s 7 report.70  
2 The Select Committee Process  
The select committee process provides an additional pre-enactment rights review 
mechanism. Select committees work on behalf of the House, enabling Parliament to 
examine in more detail any issues that arise from the introduction of a bill. Select 
committee members are urged to “consider bill of rights issues as a routine aspect of good 
committee practice.”71 Such consideration may involve following up on s 7 reports by 
hearing evidence or receiving advice from the Attorney-General or officials. The 
committee can also invite submitters to comment on any Bill of Rights implications of 
proposed legislation.72 The committee then reports on the bill to the House, often 
recommending amendments.73  
 
Both select committee scrutiny and s 7 reports facilitate the political consideration of 
rights issues and promote debate of bills in the House of Representatives. Such an extent 
of pre-enactment review of proposed legislation is arguably essential in systems of weak-
form judicial review. Judicial power in New Zealand is limited to interpreting legislation 
consistently with the statutory bill of rights, with no definitive power to declare 
legislation invalid for its inconsistency with NZBORA.74 Pre-enactment review thus can 
provide the crucial requirement for an authoritative rights review of legislation in weak-
form systems.  
 
  
69 Video interview, C Finlayson (at  3:35). 
70 Although, the review practice under s 7 has been criticised: see for example A Geddis ‘The Comparative 
Irrelevance of the NZBORA to Legislative Practice’ (2009) NZULR 465 at 477. 
71 “Effective Select Committee Membership – A guide for Members of Parliament” (Office of the Clerk of 
the House of Representatives) 2011 at 26. 
72 At 26. 
73 Standing Orders of the House of Representatives 2011, SO 287-292. 
74 Although, this view has been challenged. See Taylor v NZ Poultry Board [1984] 1 NZLR 394 at 398 per 
Cooke J. 
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There is generally no legal consequence should the political branch choose to disregard 
advice or recommendations proposed through the course of the pre-enactment review of 
legislation. The review procedure does, however, appropriately establish a certain amount 
of political accountability for the consideration and protection of fundamental rights as 
part of the legislative process. 
 
IV The Issue: No Pre-enactment Review in the United States  
Despite the general trend of pre-enactment review largely being developed in weak-form 
jurisdictions, political rights review is now also a fundamental part of many, if not most, 
countries that adhere to the strong-form review model.75 It is an accepted principle that 
more than one government branch has the duty to ensure that fundamental rights are 
protected; in fact, it is now perceived as a ‘shared’ duty, to ensure that legislation 
complies with existing, protected rights.76 Thus, political review of legislation has 
become mandatory in a large number of constitutional democracies, regardless of which 
constitutional model is adhered to. In spite of the current widespread acceptance and 
implementation of pre-enactment review, a notable absence of any mechanism for pre-
enactment review of legislation prevails in the United States. This will be discussed in the 
following sections of this paper. 
A The United States Congress 
While the United States judiciary conducts extensive ex post rights review of legislation, 
there is currently very little formal role for members of Congress to undertake rights 
review of proposed legislation during legislative enactment. The absence of political 
rights review can be assessed with regard to the historical developments of constitutional 
interpretation in the United States.  
 
The constitutional Framers did not originally explicitly direct the members of Congress to 
deliberate over matters of constitutionality; it is nonetheless now accepted that “each of 
the three branches (not just the judiciary) were presumed to be obliged to uphold, 
interpret, and explicate the Constitution.”77 There were early debates in Congress over the 
constitutionality of issues78 and any suggestions that questions of constitutionality of 
  
75 This is discussed in Part V of this paper. 
76 See generally H Volokh “Constitutional Authority Statements in Congress” (2013) 65 FLR 173. 
77 R Feingold “The Obligation of Members of Congress to Consider Constitutionality While Deliberating 
and Voting: The Deficiencies of House Rule XII and a Proposed Rule for the United States Senate” (2013) 
Vand. L Rev at 109-110. 
78 See E Hickok, The Framer’s Understanding of Constitutional Deliberation in Congress, 21 GA L 
Review, 217 (1986). 
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legislation should be left to the judiciary were “quickly shouted down”.79 The 
responsibilities of the judiciary and Congress were co-equal in determining matters of 
constitutionality, and the legislative and executive branches had to “determine in the first 
instance the extent of their own powers”.80 The courts even deferred to legislative 
judgments on a law’s constitutionality when themselves conducting legislative review.81 
However, congressional interpretation of the United States Constitution has since 
suffered a marked decline.  
 
With no express legal requirement for members of Congress to undertake constitutional 
interpretation, other than each member’s oath of office to adhere to the Constitution,82 in 
practice “the balance in constitutional interpretation has shifted heavily toward the courts 
over the past two hundred years”.83 This shift has been ascribed in part to institutional 
pressures, and in part to political convenience.84 The criticism is that members of 
Congress now lack interest in the constitutionality of measures on which they cast 
votes.85 Senators have reportedly responded to questions of constitutionality with “I’ll 
leave that to the courts”86 and the legislature’s attitude to such questions has even been 
summarised as: “That’s not my job.”87 The judiciary is thus seen to be acting somewhat 
solitarily in conducting substantial and definitive rights review of legislation. 
 
This practice raises the issue of whether it is appropriate for only one branch of 
government in the United States to undertake any sort of rights review of legislation, or 
whether such review ought to be undertaken and shared between government branches. 
Notably, the United States currently lacks any requirement for the legislative branch to 
undertake, as a matter of course, the review of proposed legislation for constitutional 
compatibility. Instead, any constitutional review of legislation is deferred to the judicial 
branches, to be undertaken ex post enactment. 
  
79 D Currie “Prolegomena for a Sampler: Extrajudicial Interpretation of the Constitution 1789-1861, in N 
Deavins and K Whittington (eds) Congress and the Constitution (Duke University Press, 2005) at 18. 
80 At 19-20. 
81 See R Feingold, above n 77, at 111. 
82 See US Constitution, art VI, § 3. 
83 H Volokh, above n 76, at 181. 
84 A Mikva “How Well Does Congress Support and Defend the Constitution?” (1983) 61 NCLLR 587, at 
588. 
85 R Feingold, above n 77 at 103.  
86 At 103. 
87 At 103. 
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B The ‘Constitutional Authority Statement’ Requirement  
With the recognition that perhaps constitutional interpretation should not take place 
solely in the courts, a “sea change” was recently called for within the United States 
legislative branch to amend the way the House of Representatives operates.88 The change 
seeks to challenge this total deference to the judiciary on questions of constitutionality, so 
that the legislative branch has some role in constitutional interpretation, for an overall 
“closer adherence to the United States Constitution.”89 This change is closely linked to 
the issue of the United States Congress currently practising little or no political pre-
enactment review of legislation. 
 
In 2011, a new rule was instituted in the United States House of Representatives to 
require members of Congress who introduce bills or resolutions to provide “a statement 
citing as specifically as practicable the power or powers granted in the Constitution to 
enact it”.90 The statement is known as a Constitutional Authority Statement (CAS). The 
CAS rule was intended to “inform and provide the basis for debate” and to demonstrate 
that Congress understands its constitutional obligation “to stay within the role established 
therein for the legislative branch.”91 
 
The 2011 rule appears to be the first explicit requirement for members of Congress to 
justify the constitutionality of their actions.92 It has been seen as a “simple and straight-
forward monitoring mechanism” to guarantee that government officials act within their 
proper authority.93 The main argument against the rule is that it changes nothing. The rule 
does not require substantial rights review, as members need only give some constitutional 
justification for the proposed legislation overall. The substance of the rule has been 
described as “decidedly benign”94 and the rule itself dismissed as “symbolic”95 and 
“trivial”.96 Critics have attacked the rule’s limited capacity, rather than its content; 
attesting even that the rule ought to be strengthened.97 
  
88 See R Feingold, above n 77, at 101. 
89 At 101.  
90 House Rule XII 7(c)(1) (112th Cong.). 
91 J Boehner, Memorandum, “New Constitutional Authority Requirement for Introduced Legislation” 
(December 2010). 
92 See R Feingold, above n 77, at 109. 
93 H Volokh, above n 76, at 4. 
94 H Volokh, above n 76, at 3-4. 
95 See R Feingold, above n 77, at 106. 
96 At 106. 
97 See H Volokh, above n 76. 
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Despite some condemnation of the rule, the required statements are “suddenly flowing 
through Congress at the rate of several hundred per month”.98 The rule has even 
generated discourse in the House on specific pieces of legislation.99 CAS’s have thus 
been deemed to be useful tools to increase congressional deliberations about the 
Constitution.100 In the light of this increased congressional activity, it may be said that the 
rule does represent an interesting and long-unprecedented movement toward having more 
constitutional discourse in Congress once again. 
 
V The Proposal: Mandatory Pre-enactment Review in the United States 
Having identified an absence of political pre-enactment review of legislation in the 
United States, and having analysed the recent introduction of the CAS requirement that is 
aimed at informing members of Congress on matters of constitutionality and promoting 
congressional debate, this paper will now explore the proposal of making some pre-
enactment review of legislation mandatory in the United States.  
 
The assessment will initially be directed toward establishing whether mandatory pre-
enactment review is a viable consideration for the United States. This will be looked at in 
the light of the United States model of constitutionalism, and will go on to canvass the 
potential arguments that might surface against such a proposition. Subsequently, the use 
of pre-enactment review in certain other jurisdictions will be assessed, in order to further 
inform the proposal being made for the United States. 
A Assessing the Viability of Pre-enactment Review in the United States  
It is important to determine whether there is prima facie some legal preclusion to the 
mandatory pre-enactment review of legislation in the United States. Such an obstacle 
could, for example, relate to an aspect of the United States Constitution itself or it could 
arise as a result of the strong-form judicial review model that the United States adheres 
to. These factors will be briefly examined, before considering what other arguments may 
surface against the proposition. 
 
As ascertained in Part IV of this paper, pre-enactment review of legislation previously 
took place in Congress as a matter of course.101 The reason it no longer occurs is due to a 
  
98 H Volokh, above n 76, at 2. 
99 R Feingold, above n 77, at 106. 
100 H Volokh, above n 76, at 5. 
101 See Part IV above; and R Feingold, above n 77, at 109-114.  
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cultural, rather than legal, shift. The accepted practice is now for the judiciary to be the 
primary, and almost always sole, institution to undertake rights review of legislation in 
the United States. Members of Congress must undertake the oath to “support and defend” 
as well as “bear true faith and allegiance” to the Constitution.102 Furthermore, no member 
of Congress can vote or introduce a bill until he or she has taken this oath.103 There has 
been no legal change to limit Congress’s authority to interpret the Constitution during the 
process of legislative enactment. From this brief analysis alone, it is sufficiently affirmed 
that pre-enactment review is not legally precluded in the United States; it has previously, 
and still can occur during the legislative process without representing a divergence from 
the Constitution or necessarily transgressing the practice of strong-form judicial review. 
 
The question then becomes: is there some cultural bar to making pre-enactment review of 
legislation mandatory in the United States? By virtue of being a cultural, rather than 
legal, barrier to the proposal, any such impediments would actually not prevent pre-
enactment review being made a requirement for the United States Congress. It would, 
however, be more challenging and less fruitful if the proposal were met with disdain by 
any number of individuals or organisations, or otherwise too reluctantly executed by 
members of Congress. It is therefore important to consider what, if any, cultural 
resistance there could be that would impact the implementation of mandatory pre-
enactment review of legislation.  
 
One cultural impediment to mandatory pre-enactment review in the United States could 
be the concern that Congress is unsuited or unable to sufficiently carry out the 
constitutional rights review of legislation. Similar apprehension has recently been voiced 
with regard to the capacity of members of Congress to produce the required 
Constitutional Authority Statements.104 The proposal might otherwise be opposed based 
on arguments that members of Congress lack the requisite expertise or resources to 
adequately carry out a sufficient pre-enactment analysis of constitutionality.105 Or the 
concern might be that such a review requirement would prove too costly and time 
consuming for members of Congress. Again, similar arguments have been made against 
the requirement for Constitutional Authority Statements.106 Finally, with regard to 
Congress’s suitability to conduct such review, it may be said that a pre-enactment review 
  
102 US oath of office set by statute (5 U.S.C. 3331), enacted by Congress. 
103 US law (2 U.S.C. 21, 25). 
104 See H Volokh, above n 76, at 188.  
105 At 191. 
106 See H Volokh, above n 76. 
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requirement is unnecessarily burdensome, formalised and bureaucratic, especially for the 
already pressured institution.107  
 
The second, and most significant, cultural impediment could be the perceived threat that 
introducing mandatory pre-enactment review would have an untoward impact on the 
overall United States constitutional framework. This perceived threat essentially boils 
down to the current, very insistent notion that the judiciary is the appropriate institution in 
the United States to conduct the constitutional rights review of legislation.108 This 
standpoint is familiar within constitutional discourse; as Stephen Gardbaum states, “the 
terms legislative and judicial supremacy thus describe not only which institution has the 
final word on any constitutional issue, but also which institution is primarily entrusted 
with the tasks of declaring and protecting citizens’ rights and liberties.”109 Accordingly, 
the United States judiciary as the final arbiter of constitutional concerns has also been 
allocated the primary responsibility for ensuring that legislation complies with the 
Constitution. This is inherent in the strong-form judicial review model. The acceptance of 
this allocation of power is reiterated in the attitudes of members of Congress and 
Senators, who have stated that it is the Supreme Court’s job to determine the matter of 
constitutionality of legislation, and not theirs.110 So even within Congress itself, there is a 
large deference to the courts on issues where the constitutionality of legislation is 
questioned. Closely related to this, the concern becomes whether mandatory pre-
enactment review would in some way influence the current United States’ constitutional 
dynamic in a way that would amount to a shift in the allocation of power between these 
institutions. Although the legislature retains the legal authority to conduct the pre-
enactment review of proposed legislation, the legal culture has developed in such a way 
that this is not openly exercised nor expected within the legislative process. If pre-
enactment review were made mandatory, it can be fathomed that, to some extent, the 
judiciary would be seen to be relieved of a duty. This refers to the accepted judicial 
responsibility in being the sole analyst to review legislation for rights compliance. 
Instead, pursuant to the proposal, the rights review responsibility may at least become a 
shared duty as between the two government branches, if not, as even more so the 
responsibility of the legislature. 
 
  
107 R Feingold, above n 77 at 112.  
108 At 103. 
109 S Gardbaum, above n 6, at 7. 
110 R Feingold, above n 77, at 103.  
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These assertions against making the pre-enactment review of legislation mandatory in the 
United States can only be fully evaluated by garnering some understanding of how the 
proposal could finally be instituted in the United States. This paper advances the 
argument that such cultural impediments to mandatory pre-enactment review can be 
overcome by the way in which the mandatory political review of legislation is 
implemented. Both concerns, as regarding Congress’s capacity to conduct such review 
and the impact that the review requirement could have on the United States constitutional 
dynamic, can be addressed by the particular way that pre-enactment review is required in 
Congress. The remainder of this paper will address this point: namely, how the proposal 
should be implemented in the United States. This evaluation will be informed by the 
practice of other jurisdictions, which will help to illustrate and discuss the possibilities for 
this proposal in the United States. 
B Pre-enactment Review in Other Jurisdictions  
One of the main possible reasons for resistance to the mandatory pre-enactment review in 
the United States has been identified as the concern of its impact on the constitutional 
structure overall.111 In particular, the impact it might have on the courts’ extensive 
powers to review and strike down legislation on the grounds of constitutionality.  It is 
appropriate to look at other jurisdictions where the constitutional dynamic is such that 
some pre-enactment review of legislation is required but also where the judiciary is 
authorised to review and strike down rights-inconsistent laws. Such an analysis will be 
useful to ascertain the ways in which pre-enactment review has formed within other 
constitutions, especially where strong-form judicial review can operate within the 
constitutional practice.112 It is essential to make this comparative consideration in order to 
critically analyse how the current proposal might be realised and, ultimately, to draw a 
conclusion as to the viability and propriety of pre-enactment review within the United 
States constitution. 
 
The constitutional operation of three other jurisdictions will be examined. The countries 
to be assessed are Australia, Canada and Japan. These jurisdictions were selected firstly, 
since each has its own mode for implementing the pre-enactment review requirement. 
Some of these mechanisms were recently introduced, while others have longer been 
incorporated as key constitutional features. These review mechanisms will be identified 
and discussed, and can ideally provide a range of possible ways that the proposal could 
  
111 See H Volokh, above n 76. 
112 This can be contrasted to pre-enactment review within New Zealand as discussed in Part III, since New 
Zealand courts do not have the power to overturn legislation that is ‘unconstitutional’. 
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be executed for the United States.  Furthermore, these jurisdictions were chosen because 
of the diverse role that pre-enactment review of legislation has in each. The diversity of 
pre-enactment review methods will be used to inform and illustrate the impact that certain 
mechanisms of pre-enactment review can have on a country’s constitution, in order to 
then relate this back to the reservations regarding its impact on the United States 
constitutional dynamic. 
 
The analysis will be made first by introducing the constitutional practice of each country, 
with a particular focus on the constitutional model adhered to and how the mandatory 
pre-enactment review is exercised. On this basis, each jurisdiction will be assessed with 
regard to the proposal being made for the United States. Particular regard will be had to 
those features that could be used in the United States to mitigate any initial concerns 
about the implementation of the proposal. It is important that any pre-enactment review 
requirement introduced in the United States would result in the least constitutional 
disruption possible. 
 
A brief overview will now be given as to each country’s relevance for the present 
proposal, before the more in depth assessment is made of each, which will help to garner 
a more concrete illustration as to how mandatory pre-enactment review of legislation 
could best be implemented in the United States. 
 
Firstly, Australia has recently introduced legislation that requires political review of 
proposed legislation within the existing overarching strong-form review framework. 
Australia’s constitutional operation is significant, due to the new legislative framework 
that provides for the political protection of human rights that was enacted in 2011. A big 
part of this is the political pre-enactment review of legislation, as well as the 
establishment of a committee for human rights matters. This framework has been 
established despite Australia having no bill of rights or other general human rights 
instruments enshrined in domestic legislation. This new framework represents a shift in 
Australia’s traditional focus on legal constitutionalism. Parliament now has responsibility 
for the protection and consideration of human rights where, previously, the judiciary have 
largely taken responsibility for the rights review of legislation. This recent introduction of 
political responsibility for the protection of rights will be assessed in terms of how well 
the requirements have been received in Australia’s constitutional practice, and where it 
may relate to the proposal for the United States. 
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Canada has long implemented pre-enactment review of legislation, while incorporating a 
judicial power that exceeds what is normally accepted in weak-form review jurisdictions. 
Despite its close geographical proximity to the United States, Canada has been one of the 
leading countries in developing weak-form judicial review. A key component of this 
development has continued to be its requirement for pre-enactment review of legislation. 
Throughout, Canada has retained a political reporting requirement as to the compatibility 
of proposed legislation with protected rights. It is interesting to assess how pre-enactment 
review has influenced Canada’s constitution overall, also having regard to its interaction 
with the judicial strike-down power, which was later enacted. The current proposal for 
the United States will be considered with regard to Canada’s longstanding practice of pre-
enactment review of legislation.  
 
Finally, Japan’s constitutional framework will be assessed. In this case, strong-form 
review authority is established by the Constitution, but is said to be ‘a failure’ in practice. 
This claim will be assessed, in particular because the ‘failure’ of strong judicial review 
has been attributed to the body that is charged with conducting the pre-enactment review 
of legislation in Japan: the Cabinet Legislation Bureau (CLB). The role and responsibility 
of the CLB in reviewing legislation for constitutional compliance will be looked at in 
order to evaluate the Japanese constitutional dynamic overall. This assessment is 
particularly relevant for considering the current proposal for the United States; since a 
key area of concern is what possible impact the mandatory pre-enactment review in 
Congress may have on the operation of other United States government organs. 
 
Following the analysis of each jurisdiction, a summary will be made that will outline 
specifically what features should be included, should pre-enactment review of legislation 
be made mandatory in the United States. 
 
1 Australia 
Australia has recently adopted a new legislative framework for the protection of human 
rights. In lieu of a court-focused model, the legislation has developed Parliament’s role, 
by introducing mechanisms for the mandatory political pre-enactment rights review of 
legislation. These developments will be assessed in terms of the specific mechanisms 
adopted, with a view to ascertaining how a similar shift to political responsibility for 
constitutional rights protection might be invoked in the United States.  
 
The Constitution of the Commonwealth of Australia of 1900 is an entrenched, supreme 
law document. Like the United States, Australia is a federal state that adheres to the 
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strong-form model of judicial review; the Australian High Court has a general authority 
to determine what the Constitution means, and it produces constitutional interpretations 
that are binding on the legislative and executive branches of government.113 The 
Constitution does not, however, explicitly authorise courts to exercise judicial review, 
much like its counterpart in the United States.114 The source of judicial review in 
Australia remains contested,115 while its legitimacy is well established and goes largely 
unquestioned.116 The High Court of Australia has even often referred to the United States 
decision of Marbury v. Madison117 when seeking to establish the basis for judicial 
review.118 The accepted view among constitutional scholars is that, from the 
Constitution’s introduction, courts possessed “the right to declare that a law of the 
Commonwealth or of a state is void by reason of transgressing the Constitution.”119 
 
Australia is also a unique jurisdiction, since it is the only democratic nation without a 
national Bill of Rights, human rights statute, or any general human rights law.120 Certain 
provisions within the Constitution itself are said to confer some express rights,121 and 
others have been interpreted to confer implied freedoms.122 A right as referred to here is 
some legal, moral or social claim to which individuals are entitled; whereas a freedom is 
properly having no government restraint or control over certain actions. As a result of this 
statutory absence, Australia does not have a large legal body of work in the field of 
individual rights.123 The recommendation to adopt a human rights act at the national level 
was recently rejected by the government,124 as it was said that such legislation would be 
‘divisive.’125 Instead, a new national ‘human rights framework’ was proposed,126 at the 
centre of which are two core mechanisms that require the pre-enactment review of 
legislation by the executive and legislative branches. The 2011 Human Rights 
  
113 K Foley “Australian Judicial Review” 6 Wash. U. Glob. Stud. L. Rev. 281 (2007), at 281. 
114 S Gardbaum, above n 6, at 204. 
115 K Foley, above n 113, at 286.   
116 At 285. 
117 William Marbury v James Madison 5 US 137 (1803). 
118 K Foley, above n 113, at 288.  
119 At 288.  
120 At 288. 
121 At 285. 
122 At 285. 
123 At 285. 
124 G Williams and L Burton “Australia’s Exclusive Parliamentary Model of Rights Protection” (2012) 
34(1) Stat. L R 58 at 70. 
125 At 71. 
126 At 71. 
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(Parliamentary Scrutiny) Act (the Act) was introduced as a key part of the new 
framework, which has given federal Parliament the responsibility for the protection of 
human rights. These new obligations show a clear movement toward featuring more 
political pre-enactment review of legislation in Australia’s constitutional practice. The 
first of the two pre-enactment review mechanisms recently introduced can be found in 
Part 3 of the Act;127 this requires that bills and legislative instruments be accompanied by 
a Statement of Compatibility (SOC) as to their compliance with a number of specified 
international human rights conventions.128 The second mechanism is the establishment by 
the Act of the Parliamentary Joint Committee on Human Rights (PJCHR). The PJCHR 
can examine claims as to legislative compatibility with human rights and other human 
rights matters.129 A brief overview of each of the Australian developments will be made, 
in order to consider how a similar constitutional shift could occur in the United States. 
 
The Act states that a member of Parliament proposing to introduce a Bill must “cause a 
statement of compatibility to be prepared in respect of that Bill”130 and cause it to be 
“presented to the House.”131 Although the SOC will “ordinarily form part of the 
explanatory memorandum for the Bill,”132 there is no specific requirement as to when the 
SOC must be presented, so the statement may be issued at a later stage, for example after 
debate has begun or after the bill has been introduced.133 This can be contrasted with New 
Zealand’s section 7 NZBORA reporting requirement, which specifies that, where a bill 
appears to be NZBORA-inconsistent, the Attorney-General must report on a bill’s 
compatibility when the bill is introduced into the House.134  
 
The SOC must include an assessment of whether the Bill is compatible with human 
rights;135 but beyond this, the level of detail that is expected of the statement is unclear. It 
has been observed that it “might amount to a lengthy analysis of the bill in light of the 
relevant human rights standards. Or, it might still amount to no more than a ‘yes, the bill 
is compatible’ or ‘no, the bill is not compatible.’”136 There is no requirement for the 
  
127 Act, ss 8 & 9. 
128 Human Rights (Parliamentary Scrutiny) Act 2011 (Australia), s 8(3). 
129 Human Rights (Parliamentary Scrutiny) Act 2011, s 7. 
130 Human Rights (Parliamentary Scrutiny) Act 2011, s 8(1). 
131 Human Rights (Parliamentary Scrutiny) Act 2011, s8(2). 
132 Human Rights (Parliamentary Scrutiny) Act 2011, Explanatory Memorandum. 
133 G Williams and L Burton, above n 124, at 75. 
134 NZBORA, s 7. 
135 Human Rights (Parliamentary Scrutiny) Act 2011, s 8(3). 
136 G Williams and L Burton, above n 124, at 75. 
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report to contain the reasons for finding a bill compatible or incompatible;137 nor is there 
a test or criteria set out, either in the Act or explanatory memorandum, to determine even 
when a protected right has been infringed by the proposed legislation.  
 
A useful analysis can be made by comparing the legislative SOC requirement with the 
equivalent requirements found in two of Australia’s states, ACT and Victoria. The ACT 
Human Rights Act requires a similar process;138 under which, the ACT government has 
been criticised for providing only a conclusion of whether or not a bill is consistent with 
human rights, without giving any reasons in support of that conclusion. By contrast, the 
Victorian requirement is that the statement must detail ‘how’ a bill is compatible with 
protected rights,139 so more detailed statements have been produced under that 
requirement. In this regard, the SOC requirement is closer to the similar ACT provision, 
since a mere conclusion of compatibility could, prima facie, satisfy the legislation. The 
Explanatory Memorandum to the Act does, however, indicate that SOCs should entail 
more than just a conclusion on a bill’s compatibility with rights; they are “intended to be 
succinct assessments aimed at informing parliamentary debate and containing a level of 
analysis that is proportionate to the impact of the proposed legislation on human 
rights”.140 No human rights are expressly set out in the Act against which the assessments 
are to be made, but the term ‘human rights’ is said to involve the rights and freedoms set 
by the seven international instruments referred to within the Act.141  
 
Such an equivocal statutory requirement ultimately leaves room for political discretion in 
determining how in-depth the produced statement will be. This may appropriately ease 
the bureaucratic burden on parliamentarians, in having to produce a compatibility 
statement for each bill that is introduced into Parliament. For example, a simple statement 
of compatibility might be suitable where the bill is clearly compatible with protected 
rights, and no further debate or discussion on the matter is needed or can be foreseen at 
the bill’s introduction. That principle might also be said to be reflected in the NZBORA 
reporting requirement, in that no s 7 report is necessary where the Attorney-General is 
satisfied that the bill complies with NZBORA rights. In the United States, one of the 
main reasons attributed to the shift of responsibility for constitutional interpretation 
toward the judiciary is, in fact, the increased institutional and political pressures on the 
  
137 At 75. 
138 Australia Capital Territory Human Rights Act 2004, s 37. 
139 Victorian Charter of Human Rights and Responsibilities Act 2006, s 28. 
140 Human Rights (Parliamentary Scrutiny) Act 2011, Explanatory Memorandum. 
141 Human Rights (Parliamentary Scrutiny) Act 2011, s 3. 
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political branches; including the growing demands on legislators’ time.142 Bearing this in 
mind, a pre-enactment review provision that commands an in-depth analysis and report of 
consistency for every bill that is introduced may be perceived as an unnecessarily 
burdensome and costly requirement for legislators, and therefore received with contempt. 
In this sense, a more discretionary pre-enactment reporting requirement, such as the 
Australian SOC provision, might be more suited to the United States political culture, and 
better received by the members of Congress themselves. 
 
The Australian SOC has limited legal effect in that it is not binding on any tribunal or 
court143 and failure to comply with the SOC requirement does not affect the validity, 
operation or enforcement of any Bill that does nonetheless become an Act.144 It has been 
suggested that SOCs may be taken into account by courts along with other extrinsic 
material used when making a decision,145 but there is no requirement on the judiciary to 
do so. Some commentators have said that a SOC stating that a bill is compatible with 
human rights is “an invitation (if not a direction) to courts to interpret (the subsequent) 
legislation consistently (with human rights).”146 However, others have attributed a lesser 
role to the SOCs in judicial decision-making: determining that, like any other extrinsic 
material, the deliberation and interpretation included within an SOC cannot trump the 
literal meaning of the text.147 A similar stance to the latter ought to be considered, should 
any constitutional report become mandatory in the United States. Given the predominant 
role of the judiciary in conducting constitutional review, prior political reports on the 
constitutionality of legislation should not have the effect of legally limiting the courts’ 
scope in conducting judicial review. Any such limits may represent an improper transfer 
of constitutional powers. Instead, the pre-enactment review of legislation is better 
considered as having the role of informing judicial decision-making, without having a 
binding legal effect. The impact of pre-enactment review on the exercise of judicial 
review will be further discussed in the context of Canadian and Japanese constitutional 
practice. 
 
The limited legal scope of the SOC is appropriate as a mechanism for the pre-enactment 
political review of legislation in Australia. Prior to the recent enactments, there was no 
  
142 See R Feingold, above n 77, at 109.  
143 Human Rights (Parliamentary Scrutiny) Act 2011, s 8(4) 
144 Human Rights (Parliamentary Scrutiny) Act 2011, s8(5). 
145 G Williams and L Burton, above n 124, at 77. 
146 At 77. 
147 At 77. 
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overt judicial deference to legislative determinations of constitutionality, since the 
judiciary determines “for itself any facts on which constitutional validity depends.”148 
This was held to be because “the federal government does not argue for a presumption of 
constitutionality”149 as no legislative findings on issues of constitutionality were made or 
included in legislation. With the recent changes, some presumption of constitutionality 
may be more readily accepted in Australian constitutional practice,150 however, this ought 
not necessarily limit the courts’ power of judicial review of legislation. 
 
The recently introduced SOC requirement might not develop a coherent dialogue between 
the courts and Parliament, but, significantly, it may succeed in creating “a dialogue 
between the executive, the Parliament, and ultimately the people by requiring Parliament 
to reveal and justify rights infringements.”151 Even where only a conclusion is drawn as 
to a bill’s compatibility with human rights, potential breaches are at least being 
considered and acknowledged by the political branches before the legislation is passed.  
To a certain extent, the SOC requirement increases political pressure during the pre-
enactment stages of law making; promoting the aim of generating rights-consistent laws 
and creating a general awareness of the compatibility of legislation with protected rights. 
Again, a similar effect may be desirable in the United States; to generally promote 
congressional debate as to the constitutionality of bills, without legally limiting the 
judiciary’s ex post review role. 
 
Part 2 of the Australian Act establishes the Parliamentary Joint Committee on Human 
Rights (PJCHR). The PJCHR consists of ten members, five from the Senate and five 
members from the House of Representatives.152 The role of the PJCHR is to examine 
Bills, legislative instruments and Acts for compatibility with human rights, and report to 
both Houses of Parliament on that issue.153 The Committee is also charged with inquiring 
into any human rights related matter that is referred to it by the Attorney-General, and 
again reporting to both Houses of Parliament on that matter; this role takes the 
Committee’s function beyond that of legislative scrutiny. The Committee has a range of 
  
148 A Mason “The Role of a Constitutional Court in a Federation: A Comparison of the Australian and the 
United States Experience,”(1986). 16 Fed L Rev. 1 at 6. 
149 At 6-7. 
150 See H Burmester “The Presumption of Constitutionality” 13 FED. L. REV. 277 (1983) (for a discussion 
of the presumption of constitutionality in Australia). 
151 G Williams and L Burton, above n 124, at 78. 
152 Human Rights (Parliamentary Scrutiny) Act 2011, s 5(1). 
153 Human Rights (Parliamentary Scrutiny) Act 2011, s 7. 
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powers in order to fulfil its functions, including the ability to hold public hearings and 
examine witnesses.154 
 
The powers granted to the PJCHR enable the committee to rigorously scrutinise new and 
existing legislation against a broad range of human rights standards. This raises the 
political cost of ignoring or neglecting those standards.155 However, with the low level of 
acceptance of such international human rights standards as a suitable measure against 
national legislation, and no actual requirement that a PJCHR report must be produced 
before legislation is passed, it is uncertain that the powers conferred will necessarily have 
a great impact in practice.156 Without the necessary use of international human rights 
standards in the United States (since legislation there would be analysed against the rights 
enshrined in the Constitution), the establishment of a specialist committee to consider the 
impact of proposed legislation on protected rights is certainly viable. Such a committee 
might alleviate some of the institutional pressures otherwise felt by individual members 
of Congress should such review be made mandatory157 and abate concerns that Congress 
itself may not have the requisite constitutional expertise to conduct pre-enactment review 
of legislation.158 
 
Since no rights-protection role is specifically allocated to the judiciary, the Australian 
Parliament is said to have exclusive responsibility for the protection of human rights 
under this new ‘human rights framework’, without any threat of judicial challenge or 
review.159 Consequently, Australia now has somewhat of an ‘exclusive parliamentary 
model’ for pre-enactment rights protection. This model is more absolute, as opposed to 
the commonly adopted ‘parliamentary rights model’ that still leaves room for some 
judicial responsibility for rights protection.160 Despite the judiciary not having an 
exclusive and specific review responsibility under the new legislative rights framework, 
the courts retain the right of judicial review and the mechanisms established under the 
recent legislation do not legally limit judicial decision-making. Perhaps the United States, 
with its current deference to judicial rights protection, would benefit from something 
more akin to an explicit ‘parliamentary rights model,’ with provision also for the courts’ 
role in constitutional interpretation. This idea will be further explored with regard to 
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Canada’s constitution; to assess whether, in practice, the courts’ discernable role has 
influenced the exercise of pre-enactment review by the political branches. 
 
Overall, Australia’s new statutory framework is helpful to demonstrate how a 
constitutional shift might be achieved, so that the pre-enactment review of legislation 
becomes an important step to ensuring rights-compliant legislation. The new framework 
focuses on the role of the political branches, without legally limiting the courts’ authority 
to conduct judicial review. These constitutional developments are particularly useful 
when considering whether a similar transformation could be made in the United States, so 
that the political branches could become responsible for some constitutional pre-
enactment ‘check’ of legislation, without affecting the overarching model of strong-form 
judicial review. 
2 Canada 
Although Canada conforms overall to the weak-form judicial review model, the country 
has developed a legal culture that is somewhat close to strong judicial review, with the 
courts having a power to invalidate legislation that is inconsistent with protected rights. It 
is the retention of this judicial power that may be helpful to inform the issue of whether 
pre-enactment review can serve to complement, rather than intrude on, current judicial 
review practice in the United States. 
 
Canada has been described as the “pioneer” in institutionalising weak-form judicial 
review.161 Twice, the country has enacted laws that pre-dated weak-form developments in 
other jurisdictions, which have affixed both mandatory political pre-enactment review 
and some judicial power of rights protection within the country’s constitutional design, 
while overarching Parliamentary sovereignty is maintained. Canada does have many of 
the features of constitutional supremacy: an entrenched, supreme law bill of rights that is 
enforced by the courts, and a judiciary that is empowered to strike down inconsistent 
statutes. However, one important right is acknowledged within Canada’s constitution to 
keep the country within the realm of weak-form judicial review: the judiciary does not 
have the absolute power of the final word; instead, this power is granted to an ordinary 
majority of the legislature.162 Already, this may represent too much of a divergence for an 
entirely pertinent comparison to the United States. 
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Importantly, Canada has also cemented its status of adhering to the weak-form judicial 
review model by its provision for the pre-enactment review of legislation. The 1960 
Canadian statutory Bill of Rights first established a reporting requirement so that the 
federal minister of justice reviewed all proposed legislation in the light of the Bill of 
Rights.163 The Bill of Rights has not been repealed and is still in effect, however, the 
Canadian Charter of 1982 has effectively superseded the Bill of Rights so that it is now 
relatively rarely used. The Canadian Charter of Rights and Freedoms 1982 amended the 
Canadian Constitution.164 The Charter is entrenched and is part of the supreme law of 
Canada,165 against which any inconsistent law has no effect, and it applies to the 
legislatures and governments on both the federal and provincial levels.166 The same 
reporting obligation on the minister of justice was not included in the Charter, however a 
similar reporting duty to that in the Bill of Rights was included in the 1985 amendment to 
the Department of Justice Act. Thus, the Canadian Minister of Justice must now certify 
that all bills have been assessed in light of the Charter, and report any inconsistencies to 
the House of Commons. This statutory reporting requirement has created an obligation 
similar to that of the Attorney-General’s under s 7 of NZBORA. The introduction of 
reporting requirements was seen as “a new political commitment for government to alert 
parliament about its intentions and actions with respect to how legislation affects 
rights.”167 This recognises that political accountability is a key factor to ensuring that 
protected rights are respected. 
 
In contrast to the exercise of New Zealand’s section 7 reporting requirement, the 
Canadian Justice Minister has never made a report of inconsistency. The lack of reporting 
has not been pinned on the political rights review of legislation being inadequate. Some 
commentators have been critical of the practice overall, saying that the influence on 
policy development has led to “overly cautious” legislating.168 The absence of reports has 
also been explained by the process that takes place before the report is made, which 
requires that proposed legislation is amended so that the minister of justice is satisfied 
that the bill put forward will likely satisfy a Charter rights challenge. This comes down to 
the executive review that has developed from the pre-enactment review requirements; 
there is a prevailing assumption that legislation deemed to be patently inconsistent with 
  
163 Canadian Bill of Rights 1960 (CBOR), s 3. 
164 The Canadian Charter was enacted as Part 1 of the Constitution Act of 1982. 
165 Constitution Act, s52 (Canada). 
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the Charter should be amended or withdrawn prior to the justice minister’s report.169 It is 
helpful to consider how the mandatory pre-enactment review of legislation can impact 
legislative practices more broadly, even before any challenge of rights-compatibility is 
formally asserted. This has the effect of ensuring that the executive and legislative 
branches seriously consider protected rights before introducing any draft legislation, with 
the promise of an adverse report should any proposed legislation be manifestly 
inconsistent with rights. 
 
Interestingly, the Canadian Charter explicitly allows a judicial power of invalidation for 
laws that are inconsistent with protected rights.170 This power goes beyond that which is 
normally granted to the judiciary under a weak-form review model;171 and it is more akin 
to the extent of judicial authority that is generally found in a strong-form review 
jurisdiction.172 The judicial power cannot be altogether classed as “strong-form,” since 
the Canadian Charter also reiterates parliamentary sovereignty with section 33, which 
allows Parliament to override any judicial declarations of incompatibility. The Canadian 
judiciary’s power therefore does not satisfy the ‘strong-form review’ requirement that 
judicial invalidation be binding at least in the short to medium run.173 
 
Significantly, it has been said that since the Charter was introduced, granting courts the 
authority to declare legislation invalid, the pre-enactment review of legislation has 
become more robust in Canada as compared to when the judiciary lacked this power 
under the Bill of Rights.174 Initially, it is reported that there was resistance to the advice 
that bills ought to be amended in order to redress likely Charter violations; however, 
following the invalidation of statutes by the Supreme Court, political charter review 
practice has increased in salience and legitimacy.175 It is difficult to draw more of a 
connection than this between judicial strike-down action and the pre-enactment political 
review of legislation, but at the very least it shows that the political branches might take a 
more serious stance on having to ensure that all legislation is rights-compliant where the 
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judiciary can strike-down rights-inconsistent laws. A similar attitude could develop in the 
United States with the introduction of some mandatory pre-enactment legislative review. 
Congress currently defers any constitutional review obligations on to the judiciary; if an 
explicit review responsibility were reserved for Congress in the pre-enactment review 
stages, the political branches could more earnestly fulfil this role, especially where there 
is the added possibility of judicial strike-down for any unconstitutional laws enacted. 
Furthermore, since the judiciary has the power of the final word in the United States, in 
contrast to Canada where the legislature can go back and override any judicial decisions, 
there may be more political incentive in the United States for Congress to ensure that 
enacted legislation does ab initio comply with protected rights. 
 
Despite being a weak-form jurisdiction, Canada’s provision for pre-enactment review that 
is accompanied by strong judicial review practices provides a good background against 
which to consider the mandatory pre-enactment review of legislation in the United States. 
Not only can pre-enactment review be undertaken without influencing the extent to which 
the judiciary can act on its own constitutional interpretations as against legislation, but 
also the existence of this strong judicial review power might serve to enhance any pre-
enactment review practice that is undertaken by the political branches. 
3 Japan 
Japan’s constitutional culture appears to be akin to the weak-form model, despite having 
a Constitution that establishes a strong-form review system. Claims have been made that 
the Japanese judiciary’s role to determine the constitutionality of legislation has been 
stifled by the exercise of pre-enactment review of legislation.176 Japan’s constitutional 
practice will be analysed, with a focus on the practice of pre-enactment review there, in 
order to discuss how this could influence the pre-enactment review proposal for the 
United States. 
 
The Japanese Constitution of 1946 is one of the world’s oldest functioning constitutions. 
It has endured despite the Constitution’s formation being deemed an “unnatural event” 
due, in part, to the fact that it was drafted primarily in English while the country was 
under occupation.177 Although the circumstances surrounding its drafting make the 
  
176 J Satoh “Judicial Review in Japan: An Overview of the Case Law and an Examination of Trends in the 
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Constitution an “odd case,”178 Japan’s constitutional arrangement overall can be said to 
conform to the traditional constitutional model of strong-form judicial review. The 
Constitution grants the Supreme Court the status of “the court of last resort”179 with the 
broad power “to determine the constitutionality of any law, order, regulation, or official 
act.”180 The Supreme Court then delegates this power of ex post constitutional review to 
the inferior courts.181 
 
It can be said that Japan’s strong-form review status is true in theory, but is not soundly 
reflected in constitutional practice. The Supreme Court has a policy of extreme deference 
to the legislative and executive branches and has upheld the constitutionality of most 
government actions that are contested before it.182 In fact, judicial review has been 
characterised there as “a failure in more than one sense”183 and the court has even been 
said to play a “somewhat secondary role” in determining the constitutionality of 
legislation.184 
 
The courts will review the constitutionality of legislative actions, but there is little chance 
that such actions will actually be struck down by the judiciary.185 The reason for this 
deference remains disputed,186 but the Court has certainly garnered the reputation of 
being “the most conservative and cautious in the world” with regard to its exercise of 
judicial review.187 Since its establishment over six decades ago, the Japanese Supreme 
Court has struck down few laws on constitutional grounds, especially when compared to 
its counterparts in other jurisdictions.188 Although the Japanese Constitution itself 
authorises strong-form judicial review (which represents a step further than the United 
States Constitution, where the courts themselves asserted that such authority exists189), it 
can be said that Japan has developed a constitutional practice that is more familiar to a 
culture of weak-form judicial review, where the judiciary will not strike down rights-
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inconsistent legislation. The judiciary retains final authority on matters of 
constitutionalism in Japan, overriding that of the legislative and executive branches. 
However, the pre-enactment review of legislation is a key feature of Japan’s 
constitutional practice, and may impact on the frequency that the judiciary will actually 
exercise the ex post constitutional review of laws, as it has the power to do. 
 
Some commentators have directly attributed the Court’s passive approach reviewing 
legislation to the existence and workings of the Cabinet Legislation Bureau (CLB).190 The 
CLB is charged with conducting the pre-enactment review of legislation in Japan, which 
it does through reports of constitutionality for proposed legislation. It is an institution 
made up of senior bureaucrats, who are sent to serve there after having some fifteen to 
twenty years’ experience in other Japanese government ministries or agencies.191 The 
CLB was originally modelled on the French Conseil d’Etat and set up as the key advisory 
organ to the government.192 The institution has two formal tasks: the first is to provide 
opinions to the Prime Minister and the Cabinet on legal issues; the second is to examine 
drafts of all bills, regulations, Cabinet orders, and treaties for consistency with the 
constitution and legal precedents.193 The CLB has thus been referred to as the Prime 
Minister’s “in-house lawyer” and as providing a “check” on Diet legislation.194 The pre-
enactment review undertaken by the CLB takes the form of an exhaustive and 
authoritative legal assessment of all proposed policies, which results in the issuing of 
“unified government interpretations.”195 The CLB’s opinions have a significant legal 
influence within the country’s constitution.196 The propriety of the CLB’s involvement in 
substantial political issues is controversial, since the Japanese Constitution itself does not 
make provision for the CLB’s advisory role. The Supreme Court has, however, held that 
the pre-enactment review of legislation by the CLB is not in violation of the 
Constitution.197 
 
It has been acknowledged that the views of the CLB are not legally binding, but they are 
accepted as authoritative and cannot be easily overturned by politicians in the course of 
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legislative enactment.198 The CLB review is therefore a mechanism to ensure that 
legislative and executive acts are in compliance with the Constitution, and the institution 
can declare legislation unconstitutional during its pre-enactment review. While the CLB 
might be seen as authoritative during the ex ante review of legislation, the extent of the 
impact that the institution has on the other branches of government, for example on the 
judiciary’s ex post review role, has been questioned. 
 
The purpose of the CLB, it is said, is to “avoid the type of legal confusion seen in the 
United States when legislative decisions are found to be unconstitutional by courts after 
their enactment.”199 This appears to indicate that judicial findings of unconstitutionality 
are undesirable, only leading to confusion and inconsistency. However, strong judicial 
review that allows for the invalidation of unconstitutional legislation has long been 
accepted as an important check on legislative power within strong-form jurisdictions.200 
Further to this, the CLB’s influence has been heralded as the reason for the Japanese 
Supreme Court’s reluctance to declare laws unconstitutional, since “the oversight role 
originally designed for the Court in the Constitution has largely been subsumed by the 
Cabinet Legislation Bureau.”201 The practice has been criticised since “the fact that the 
CLB serves as the highest interpretive authority on the Constitution is itself a violation of 
the Constitution.”202 The apparent judicial reluctance to determine the constitutionality of 
laws has also raised questions concerning the judiciary’s independence, namely, whether 
the courts can properly be considered as being free from undue political influence.203 
 
It is important to look at why the CLB is seen to have such a wide influence within 
Japan’s constitution. Extensive academic discussion of this topic has already 
developed.204 One argument is that pre-enactment review by the CLB is so effective and 
thorough that the judiciary is unlikely to find constitutional flaws in final legislation.205 
However, this reasoning has been dismissed as “unduly optimistic” since the CLB cannot 
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be said to be better at screening legislation for constitutional infringements than other 
review institutions elsewhere.206 The more likely suggestion has been made that the 
nature of the ties between the CLB and the judiciary has impacted on the influence that 
the CLB is seen to have on judicial practice.207 Since the CLB is made up of elite senior 
bureaucrats, most of whom have expertise in legal matters,208 it already differs in nature 
from where pre-enactment review is conducted exclusively by the political branch of 
government, within an institution made up only of political representatives. Some 
bureaucratic influence is often expected within pre-enactment review elsewhere, in the 
form of legal advice on matters of constitutionality or rights compliance.209 However, this 
is largely distinct to the position in Japan, by virtue of the CLB’s ex ante review being 
seen as binding and authoritative as it regards the political branches of government.210 
Bureaucratic involvement in other jurisdictions is usually limited to technical and legal 
advice on legislation, which the political branches are often at liberty to disregard.211 The 
CLB bureaucrats are, in fact, closer in governmental standing to apolitical members of 
the judiciary, who have binding authority over the legislative branch of government, than 
to politicians. This is echoed in the fact that former members of the CLB are often 
appointed as judges of the Supreme Court, even without having prior judicial 
experience.212 As a result, members of the judiciary have “no doubt” found themselves 
having to determine the constitutionality of legislation that they themselves had 
previously reviewed and approved when serving on the CLB.213 This at least has some 
bearing on whether the judiciary can be accurately perceived as a final, independent 
check on the political branch. 
 
Although the CLB is charged with the pre-enactment review of legislation, both its 
bureaucratic membership and its influential and highly legalistic constitutional role can 
be distinguished from how ex ante legislative review is conducted in countless other 
jurisdictions. The CLB goes further than providing politicians with advice on proposed 
legislation in order for the legislators to make informed conclusions on rights; instead, the 
decisions conferred by the CLB are conceived as being binding on legislators, amounting 
to a final authoritative review of the legislative proposals. This also leaves little room for 
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later judicial decisions to challenge the constitutionality of legislation that has already 
been assessed by the CLB. 
 
Given the importance of independent judicial review of legislation in the United States as 
an ex post mechanism for rights protection, a similar form of pre-enactment review to the 
CLB’s authority in Japan would not be appropriate. In order to avoid limiting the United 
States judiciary’s constitutional role, a more political, rather than bureaucratic, focus 
would be suitable. Pre-enactment review should also not amount to legal determinations 
made binding on politicians and legislative developers. It should aim to inform politicians 
on rights-based analyses of proposed bills, and to encourage legislative debate and 
consideration of rights issues throughout the enactment process.  
 
This analysis of Japan’s constitutional practice can be used to illustrate the sort of pre-
enactment review that might legitimise concerns as to why pre-enactment review may not 
be suited to the United States. It is important to identify that pre-enactment review need 
not necessarily take the same form as in Japan. Against the background of the other 
jurisdictions assessed, it can be seen that mandatory pre-enactment review of legislation 
could amount to little more than establishing a political incentive to openly legislate in 
accordance with protected rights. 
 
VI Discussion: The Possibility for Pre-enactment Review in the United 
States  
The preceding discussion of pre-enactment review in the jurisdictions of Australia, 
Canada and Japan is intended to guide how the mandatory pre-enactment review of 
legislation could be implemented in the United States. The discussion focused on the 
features of each country’s constitutional framework. It was particularly directed to what 
form pre-enactment review of legislation can take, and in what ways it can interact with 
other governmental operations, in order to best inform the proposal being made for the 
United States. 
 
The paper will now briefly discuss and summarise the sort of mandatory political review 
of legislation that should be considered for the United States.  
 
Firstly, it is now a widely accepted principle that not only one government branch is 
responsible for the protection of fundamental rights. In most constitutional systems, the 
judiciary has long been accepted as the body that will conduct legislative review on an ex 
post basis, as needed. It is now also accepted that, regardless of the scope of subsequent 
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judicial review, Congress, or the legislative organ of the state in general, should have 
some interpretive responsibility to also ensure the protection of rights.214 This has led to 
the formalisation of this responsibility across jurisdictions worldwide. Explicit 
requirements have been introduced, in the form of pre-enactment review, making it 
mandatory for the political branches of government to undertake some ex ante rights 
review of proposed legislation. A ‘shared responsibility’ between the political and 
judicial branches is now acknowledged as appropriate for the protection of fundamental 
rights.215 
 
It is concerning that the United States has incorporated no such pre-enactment review 
requirement into its constitutional practice. In earlier constitutional practice, Congress did 
undertake constitutional interpretation when considering bills, without any explicit 
requirement to do so.216 However, this practice has dwindled over the years, so that now 
almost no constitutional interpretation or rights consideration openly occurs in Congress 
before the enactment of legislation. Since ex post review in the United States is firmly the 
responsibility of the courts, and only the courts, legislators currently have no role in 
constitutional interpretation.  
 
United States constitutional practice is now somewhat of an exception, since the widely 
accepted ‘shared responsibility’ notion is nowhere to be found. In fact, the attitude of 
legislators is currently paradoxical, with constitutional interpretation being brushed off as 
being the job of the courts.217 Even the recent CAS requirement in Congress has not gone 
far enough in making it clear that members of Congress have a duty to take into account 
the constitutionality of the measures on which they vote. Instead, this has imposed a 
minimal requirement for members of Congress to assert the source of their legislative 
authority, without having to have any real regard for the constitutionality of the bill that 
they are introducing.218  
 
This paper’s suggested resolution is to explicitly require more of United States 
legislators, so that Congress must openly undertake some rights review of legislation 
before it is enacted. The main concern with this sort of suggestion is that it might be 
perceived as having too much of an impact on the constitutional culture overall where, it 
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may be asserted, there is nothing fundamentally wrong with the status quo. Some 
constitutional discussion perhaps does already take place to a degree in Congress, but this 
is not sufficient if it only occurs behind closed doors. Some political accountability must 
be established.219 
 
Along with the acceptance that Congress has some responsibility for the consideration 
and protection of rights, it is important to recognise that pre-enactment review need not 
inhibit or in any way limit the operation of any government branch. It can act simply as a 
mechanism to facilitate the open discussion of constitutional issues within the legislature 
and to create some political accountability for the protection of rights. The mandatory 
pre-enactment review of legislation can be instituted in a number of ways, depending on 
the constitutional system in question. It is for this reason that concerns regarding the 
impact of such review can be looked at in the light of pre-enactment review in other 
jurisdictions, to form an idea of how it may be best instituted in the United States. 
 
It is essential to first make clear that the sort of pre-enactment review instituted in Japan, 
of a more bureaucratic and legally binding nature, should be avoided in the United States, 
should some mandatory review be introduced. The Japanese constitutional culture that 
has developed focuses on ex ante review of legislation, which, due to substantial political 
pressure and the high level of influence between institutions, is largely accepted as the 
final, authoritative interpretation of constitutional rights.  
 
In order to retain complete judicial independence on matters of constitutionality in the 
United States, as well as adhere firmly to the doctrine of strong-form judicial review, it is 
important that the right balance is struck between a pre-enactment review requirement 
that is robust enough so that it will be considered sincerely and complied with by 
Congress, but will still not have too great an impact on any other existing government 
operations. 
 
Aspects of both the Australian and Canadian models of pre-enactment review serve as 
good exemplars for the United States. The new model of rights protection in Australia 
demonstrates how pre-enactment review of legislation can be introduced, without 
involving substantial constitutional upheaval or disruption. The Canadian model, with 
some similar processes to New Zealand, also involves aspects of pre-enactment review 
that can inform and strengthen a possible constitutional model for the United States.  
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One pre-enactment review mechanism in particular should be introduced into the United 
States legislative process, so that the political rights review of proposed legislation 
becomes mandatory. This is a new rule requiring a report of constitutionality to be made 
upon every bill’s introduction into Congress, which contains an assessment of whether 
the bill is compatible with the rights and freedoms enshrined in the Constitution. This 
requirement should be implemented in addition to the current CAS that is required when 
a bill is first presented.  
 
This paper proposes that the new rule be largely based on the Australian requirement of a 
‘Statement of Compatibility,’220 with a few necessary modifications. First, like the 
NZBORA s 7 requirement,221 it should be specified that the report must be presented 
upon the bill’s introduction into Congress. This is in order to adequately promote and 
facilitate constitutional discussion from the beginning of the legislative process. The 
report should be drafted and presented by somebody other than the member of Congress 
proposing the legislation, who is nonetheless a part of the political, rather than judicial, 
branch of government. This might be executed similarly to the report required under the 
Canadian Charter, which requires the Minister of Justice to report as to a bill’s 
compliance with Charter rights and freedoms.222 The proposed report should contain an 
assessment of the bill in the light of the rights and freedoms guaranteed by the United 
States Constitution. Like the Australian requirement, this assessment need not always be 
exhaustive, but should contain ‘a level of analysis that is proportionate to the 
[constitutional] impact of the proposed legislation.’223 This is to prevent the requirement 
from being perceived as overly burdensome on legislators, especially in the case of a bill 
that plainly complies with the constitution. The report should be informed by draft 
submissions as to the bill’s constitutionality, created both by legal and constitutional 
specialists as well as individual members of Congress, where appropriate. In order to 
fulfil this requirement, the bill should be circulated prior to its formal introduction into 
Congress.224 
 
  
220 As required under Human Rights (Parliamentary Scrutiny) Act 2011 (Australia), s 8(3). 
221 NZBORA, s 7. 
222 Canadian Charter of Rights and Freedoms 1982. 
223 Modified from the Human Rights (Parliamentary Scrutiny) Act 2011 (Australia), Explanatory 
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The new rule should also contain some direct reference to the United States constitution, 
in order to enhance its legitimacy and standing as an important new requirement for the 
legislative process. This could be achieved by the text of the rule relating directly, for 
example, to the oath of office that each member of Congress must undertake.225 This 
entails members of Congress pledging to “support and defend” and “bear true faith and 
allegiance” to the Constitution. Such wording could be directly incorporated into the new 
rule. This could reiterate the notion that, as legislators, each member of Congress has a 
constitutional duty to ensure that any legislation enacted complies with the Constitution. 
Similar reasoning was given for introducing the requirement of Constitutional Authority 
Statements.226 However, this idea should be taken further by actually including this 
constitutional reference within any new pre-enactment rule. This would reinforce that it is 
expected that members of Congress consider the constitutionality of all legislative 
proposals before they are enacted. 
 
Additionally, in order to receive proper and thorough advice as to the bill’s constitutional 
compliance, a specialist committee could be established to scrutinise proposed legislation 
for this purpose. After deliberation, this committee would be able to submit their 
considerations to be included within the report of constitutionality. This advice would be 
of a legalistic nature, but it is essential that it serve only to inform legislative debate, 
without compelling members of Congress to abide by any recommendations made. The 
formation of the committee could be modelled on the PJCHR in Australia,227 in that it 
could properly consist of a small number of members from each the United States Senate 
and House of Representatives.  
 
Finally, the report presented should not be legally binding on Congress. It should only 
serve to bring to light any potential issues of constitutionality, so that these can be 
debated and possibly remedied before the legislation is enacted. There ought to be no 
legal ramifications should Congress choose to disregard any or all issues that are brought 
to light by the constitutionality report. In such a case, the bill itself perhaps could detail 
why the majority in Congress thinks that the legislation is constitutional. The reporting 
function ought to create only political accountability, so that congressional action in 
conflict with a report could result only in political ramifications. Furthermore, the validity 
  
225 United States Congress Oath of office (current wording) see above, Part V. 
226 J Boehner, Memorandum, “New Constitutional Authority Requirement for Introduced Legislation” 
(December 2010).  
227 Human Rights (Parliamentary Scrutiny) Act 2011, s 5. 
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of any legislation later enacted should not be affected by any constitutional report that has 
been presented to Congress.228  
 
It is important to clarify that the constitutionality report should not be seen as legally 
binding on any branch of government. Not only the legislature, but also the judiciary 
should not be legally bound to uphold the advice in the report. It should form a part of the 
legislative process only: recognised as a tool to enhance legislative debate over bills in 
Congress. Should the judiciary be charged with determining the constitutionality of 
legislation that has received a legislative constitutionality report, perhaps at most, courts 
could see the report properly as an extrinsic aid to legislative interpretation, along with 
other parliamentary materials.229 No more weight than this should be attributed to the 
political reports in the courts. Even its consideration as an extrinsic material will depend 
on the direct influence that the report is perceived to have on the enacted legislation. 
 
Overall, this proposal aims to amend the cultural perspective that has developed in the 
United States: that members of Congress do not have a responsibility to conduct 
constitutional interpretation when enacting legislation. This has manifested due to 
political and institutional pressures, and has resulted in little or no constitutional 
engagement in Congress during policy development and legislative enactment. This pre-
enactment review requirement would ensure that due regard can be had to constitutional 
rights and freedoms during the legislative process in the United States, and that any issues 
of constitutionality will be brought to light as soon as a bill is introduced into Congress. 
This requirement also aims to ensure that the congressional consideration of these rights 
would not amount to a burdensome or overly bureaucratic task, so that the constitutional 
development could be well received into the existing legislative process. 
 
VII Conclusion 
There is ultimately discretion in deciding the way in which government power should be 
institutionalised within every legal jurisdiction. Of utmost importance within the choice 
that is available is the determination of how existing rights will be protected. This 
amounts to determining the responsibilities of each of the government branches. This 
paper has demonstrated the importance of ensuring that more than one government 
branch has the responsibility for protecting previously recognised rights. It ought to be a 
shared duty as between government institutions, in order for rights to be upheld to the 
fullest extent. 
  
228 A similar provision can be found in the Human Rights (Parliamentary Scrutiny) Act 2011, s 9. 
229 See G Williams and L Burton, above n 124, at 77. 
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Some trends may develop within different constitutional models that influence how the 
government powers and duties are typically allocated; this was made evident through the 
discussion of strong- and weak-form judicial review as alternative constitutional models. 
Overall, strong-form judicial review tends to focus on the responsibility of the judiciary 
in the protection of rights; whereas weak-form review jurisdictions generally include 
more provision for the legislative and executive branches to conduct some rights review 
during the legislative stages of law making. These trends do not, however, dictate that 
only these government branches should be burdened with all the responsibility for rights-
protection. It is due to this fact that the proposal for mandatory pre-enactment review in 
the United States could be considered and discussed throughout this paper.  
 
The absence of any formal pre-enactment review in the United States Congress is 
concerning, and not brought about solely due to the jurisdiction’s adherence to strong-
form judicial review. It is for this reason that the analysis of other strong-form review 
jurisdictions could provide invaluable insight to inform the suggestion to make some 
form of pre-enactment review mandatory in the United States.  
 
The pre-enactment review procedure suggested for the United States admittedly does not 
propose to address and resolve all the criticisms that have been made of current 
constitutional practices. The proposal was developed throughout the paper as a 
mechanism that will at least shape the way in which members of Congress are perceived 
to conduct themselves throughout the legislative process, in particular when considering 
the constitutionality of legislation. Without any formal requirement, Congress has been 
deemed to not consider at all the constitutionality of proposed legislation, before it is 
voted on in the House. The aim of the proposal as it has been developed is not to radically 
alter the United States constitutional practice, nor to displace the considerable deference 
that is granted to the judicial branch to make determinations of constitutionality. Rather, 
the proposal takes aspects from other jurisdictions that incorporate some mandatory pre-
enactment review processes, in order to advance a procedure that may enhance the 
legislative process in the United States. This procedure would ensure that legislators do at 
least always openly consider the constitutionality of proposed legislation.  
 
Should such a procedure for pre-enactment review be adopted, this paper strongly 
advances the argument that it should be designed to have minimal impact on the overall 
constitutional working in the United States. There may, of course, be some other, flow-on 
effects of such a requirement being introduced into Congress. However, the overall 
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structure of the United States’ strong-form judicial review constitutional model need not 
be displaced. 
 
The suggested pre-enactment political review process would go a long way toward 
enhancing the existing legislative process in the United States Congress and, vitally, to 
ensuring that there is an additional, ex ante check of proposed legislation to help 
safeguard protected rights. 
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